This study investigates whether investors see through materially misstated earnings, and whether they anticipate earnings restatements. For firms that restate at least one annual report, we find that investors are misled by mistakes in reported earnings at the time of initial earnings announcements. Investors react positively to the component of the favorable earnings surprise that will subsequently be restated, and attach the same valuation to it as to the true earnings surprise. We also find that investors anticipate the subsequent downward restatements and start marking stock prices down several months before a restatement announcement, so that the full impact of a restatement is about three times as large as the initial announcement effect. Overall our findings indicate that although investors anticipate restatements several months before its announcement, they are misled by misstated earnings for several years and therefore would benefit from better quality of financial information.
The goal of this paper is to provide a comprehensive analysis of investors' ability to see through mistakes in financial statements. Our study differs from prior literature on 2 1 Several studies document negative abnormal reaction to the announcement of restatements of about 9% around a two-day restatement announcement period (Palmrose, Richardson and Scholz (2004) and Agrawal and Cooper (2008) ). Hribar and Jenkins (2004) show that the implied cost of equity goes up after restatement. Graham, Li and Qiu (2008) find that cost of debt is also adversely affected by restatement announcement. Moreover, restating firms decrease labor and investment after restatement (Kedia and Philippon (2007) ).
restatements in that it focuses on market reaction to the original announcement of misstated earnings and the valuation of restating firms in the error period, which extends from the first misstated period to the day of restatement announcement. 2 To the best of our knowledge, no prior study examines the market reaction to initial announcements of incorrect earnings that are subsequently restated. Only one previous study examines valuation in the error period for an older and smaller sample of restatements (Kinney and McDaniel (1989) ).
In the absence of mistakes in financial statements, abnormal returns associated with earnings announcements are an increasing function of earnings surprises. For our sample of 492 restatements, we decompose the earnings surprise into two components:
the true earnings surprise and the surprise due to the error. 3 If investors are misled by erroneous earnings and treat the correct and error components the same, then any associated abnormal returns will be proportionately the same for each component.
Indeed, for the sub-sample of firms that restated at least one annual report we find that, during the error period, investors react positively to the error component of the earnings surprise and attach the same valuation to the error component of the earnings surprise as to the true part of the earnings surprise. Furthermore, our evidence suggests 2 For example, the error period of a company with a fiscal year end on December 31 that restated 1999 and 2000 annual reports on April 10, 2001 starts on January 1, 1999 and ends on April 9, 2001. 3 3 Mistakes in financial statements can be either intentional or unintentional. Some mistakes in financial statements can be due to pure internal control failure or judgment error, while the management of some firms can be intentionally misleading investors. Richardson, Tuna and Wu (2003) say that "it is reasonable to assume that earnings restatement firms can be characterized as firms who knowingly and intentionally engaged in earnings manipulation." We do not make a judgment regarding the intent of the company that makes a mistake and do not differentiate between intentional and unintentional mistakes in this study. Our focus is on the impact of mistakes on stock returns irrespective of the intent. We do differentiate between firms that acknowledged fraud during the announcement of the restatement. However, the identification of fraud is very difficult because motivations for fraud and aggressive accounting are the same (DeFond and Jiambalvo (1991) and Dechow and Skinner (2000) ). Moreover, the acknowledgement of fraud as a reason for restatement can be due to embezzlement by lower rank employees rather than the misdeeds of top level management.
that investors are more misled by mistakes made at the beginning rather than at the end of the error period.
Firms that restate earnings downward experience negative abnormal returns several months before they restate. This result holds for both annual and quarterly restatements (restate only 10-Qs) and for various methods of calculating abnormal returns. The magnitude of abnormal buy-and-hold returns prior to restatement announcements is more than twice the announcement effect. 4 Moreover, firms with downward quarterly restatements exhibit negative abnormal performance after the restatement announcement. Hence, the total negative impact of a restatement is much larger than the announcement effect. Somewhat surprisingly, we find that firms that understate earnings and thus subsequently restate earnings upward, also experience negative abnormal returns one month prior to their restatement and at the restatement announcement, suggesting that restatements are bad news even when firms revise earnings up.
Securities regulators could interpret our results as supporting the view that investors would benefit from improved financial reporting practices. Although investors start to anticipate restatements several months prior to announcement, they are misled at the initial announcement of erroneous earnings. The average length of the error period is two years for the full sample and two and a half years for annual restatements, so investors are trading on erroneous information for quite some time.
In addition to examining valuation in the error period, we also study returns of restating firms during two other periods: (1) the three-year period prior to the 1 st restated 4 4 Announcement effect calculated for a three day window around restatement starting on day -1 equals -11% (-10%) for annual (quarterly) downward restatements.
report (pre-error period); (2) and the three-year period after the restatement announcement (post-restatement period). We find little evidence of abnormal performance in the pre-error period and find some evidence of abnormal negative performance in the post-restatement period for firms that restate net income downward.
In addition, we find firms that make mistakes in core accounts, such as revenue and cost, underperform more than other restating firms in the last quartile of the error period, suggesting that investors penalize firms more for core account mistakes. 5 Firms that commit fraud and later restate have better performance in the first quartile of the error period than non-fraud restaters, suggesting that fraudulent earnings misstatements are harder to detect.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 contains restatement timeline, research questions, and statistical methods. Section 3 describes the data. Section 4 reports test results and their implications. Section 5 concludes the paper.
Restatement timeline, research questions and methods

Restatement timeline and return periods defined
Several prior studies provided partial evidence regarding firm valuation in different parts of the error period. We define the error period as the time between the start of the first restated reporting period and the restatement announcement. No prior study, with the exception of Kinney and McDaniel (1989) , carefully define the error period or analyzes returns during that time. Most previous studies use fixed time windows around the restatement or the beginning of the error period and consequently mix returns from 5 the pre-error, error-and post-restatement periods. 6 Kinney and McDaniel (1989) examine the error period and find negative abnormal returns (measured for the full error period) for a limited sample (73 quarterly restatements filed between 1976 and 1985). But they do not break the error period into sub-periods, and unlike other studies, for their limited sample, they do not find significant negative abnormal returns at the restatement announcement, suggesting that the sample may not be representative of more recent restatements. Figure 1 illustrates the restatement timeline. We start by precisely defining the error period ( , ) . It begins at the start of the first reporting period that contains a mistake in earnings ( ) and ends on day, , when management corrects earnings and reveals their true value.
Finance theory suggests that investors value stock using expected future cash flows; however, investors often rely on reported earnings to help them estimate expected cash flows. Graham, Harvey and Rajgopal (2005) document that the majority of firms view earnings as the key metric for an external audience, more so than cash flows.
Earnings are also used as part of price earnings ratios, a widely-used valuation method of 6 Agrawal and Chadha (2005) examine cumulative abnormal returns over two years prior to, and one year after, restatement announcements. Badertscher, Collins and Lys (2007) show cumulative abnormal returns for 240 trading days before and 820 trading days after the beginning of the first restated period. Frieder and Shanthikumar (2007) show cumulative abnormal returns for the period of 252 trading days before and after restatement and calculate various measures of abnormal returns for the month before restatement.
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7 We start the error period at the beginning of the first restated financial reporting period rather than the announcement of earnings for this period for several reasons. First, we would lose observations because of missing earnings announcement dates in Compustat/ I/B/E/S. Second, management provides earnings guidance ahead of earnings announcements, and investors' behavior even before the announcement of incorrect earnings can reflect their ability to see through mistakes or be fooled by them, especially if competing firms announce their earnings before the subject firm. Moreover, the reader can visually "move" point on all graphs by 120 days/four months so that corresponds to the approximate point of the announcement of the first misstated quarter. To determine how much investors are initially misled by misstated earnings we first examine short-term market reaction to the initial announcement of incorrect earnings. Starting with Ball and Brown (1968) , prior literature has shown that earnings announcement returns are a positive function of how much earnings deviate from expectations. 9 The standard test of the relation is:
where, is the abnormal return at the earnings announcement at time t, is the firm's correctly stated net income at time t, and is the market's expectation of net income just prior to earnings announcement. should lead to larger (smaller) abnormal announcement returns than equation (1) predicts.
We study this relation with
where M t (Mistake) is the amount by which earnings are misstated. We estimate equation (2) for our sample of restating firms, and for control firms matched to restating firms based on size, book-to-market and industry (3 digit NAICS code). Since the focus of most of our analysis is the error period, the match is performed just before the error period in year m-1, where m is the fiscal year of a firm's first mistake. 11 First, for each firm we limit potential control firms to those with the same 3 digit NAICS code. 12 Next, we find the closest firm in size and book-to-market using the method proposed by Lyon, Barber and Tsai (1999) , which is widely used in the literature;
first identifying all potential control firms with size between 70% and 130% of that of the restating firm, and then choosing the one with the book-to-market value closest to that of the restating firm. 13 Size is measured by the market value of equity at m-1. Book-tomarket ratio is calculated as the ratio of book equity to market equity at m-1. We eliminate all restating firms from the pool of potential control firms. We also require control firms to have CRSP returns for at least as many trading days as the corresponding restating firm one year prior to the matched restating firm's mistake date and one year subsequent to the restatement date.
11 The matching is based on fiscal, not calendar year. For example, if a firm's fiscal year ends on March 31 and it made the first mistake in year ending March 31, 1999, then the size and book-to-market for period m-1 correspond to the year of March 31, 1998 (in COMPUSTAT, fiscal year 1997). The matching firm is then found based on size and book-to-market ratios calculated for 1997 fiscal year irrespective of the month of the fiscal year-end for the matching firm. 12 A number of studies suggest the importance of matching on industry (Kahle and Walkling (1996) , Barber and Lyon (1997) ). Matching on industry is particularly important for this study because accounting rules vary by industry and our sample includes financials and utilities.
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13 For 30 restating firms there were no controls that satisfied data requirements. For these firms we chose a control firm that is the closest in size within 3 digit NAICS code. The difference in size of control firms for this group and restating firms ranges between 32% and 158% of the size of the restating firms, with the mean of 59% and the median of 54%. For two restating firms control firms were found as the closest in size within 2 digit NAICS code. If mistakes in financial reporting allow restating firms to exceed (meet) investor's expectations and investors do not see through the financial reports, abnormal returns in the error period should be positive (zero). Negative abnormal returns in the error period for a firm that is reporting that it exceeded investor expectations (when actual results were less than expected) would suggest that investors see through overstated earnings.
Because investors' perceptions of true earnings and the associated abnormal returns could observations. Third, we restrict the sample to firms for which GAAP and Street earnings are the same (55% of 553 restating firm observations with available data for estimating equation (2)). All approaches yield coefficients of the same sign and similar magnitude and significance. Inference regarding the difference between the coefficient estimates is also the same. 16 Our results are very similar using the equally weighted index and market model adjusted returns. For market model adjusted returns we use standard event study methodology and estimate market model for a one year period starting on day -46 relative to earnings announcement using CRSP market index. We reported results using market adjusted returns because we lose fewer observations when calculating returns this way.
change during the error period, we split the error period into quartiles (where each quartile represents one fourth of the error period and is firm specific).
Our analysis of the ability of the market, and hence the marginal investor, to anticipate restatements is related to prior literature that studied the trading behavior of sophisticated investors preceding restatements. For example, Efendi, Kinney and
Swanson (2004) and Desai, Krishnamurthy and Venkataraman (2006) , show that short interest increases prior to restatements and declines thereafter, and the larger the short interest, the larger the short-term stock price decline at the restatement announcement.
These studies examine fixed time intervals prior to the restatement date instead of All of these studies used the Government Accountability Office (GAO) sample of restatements. The GAO sample includes many restatements due to changes in accounting standards (such as FASB 101, FASB 142 and others) that do not necessarily represent an 18 Securities class action lawsuits filed under Rule 10b-5 allege material flaws pertaining to firms' disclosure. Allegedly, firms' misstatements cause inflation in the stock price during the class action period. Most of these lawsuits are filed on behalf of shareholders who bought the stock during the period of inflated stock prices and are entitled to compensation.
accounting error, and can be more easily anticipated. We reviewed all restatements and deleted restatements that were caused by a change in accounting standard and did not correct an accounting error.
Data
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Restatement dates and restatement characteristics were hand collected from the Lexis-Nexis and Factiva databases. The Lexis-Nexis and Factiva databases were researched using key words "restatement," "restat," "revis," "adjust," "error" and "responding to guidance from the SEC" for the period January 1, 1997 through June 30,
2002. We selected this period for two reasons. First, the GAO made a sample of restatements announced in this period publicly available. Second, all restatements precede the Sarbanes-Oxley Act. Therefore, all restatements in our sample were made in the same regulatory environment. We cross-checked our sample with the GAO sample and added all restatements in the GAO sample that were not identified by the Lexis_Nexis search. Table 1 , Panels A and B compare our sample to that of the GAO and present the reasons for deleting GAO restatements. Overall, we deleted 431 restatements out of the total of 918 restatements in the GAO sample. We excluded restatements that were caused by an adoption of new accounting rules or a change in method of accounting (130 restatements), and retained only restatements due to a mistake (including fraud) or an improper interpretation of GAAP. We also deleted restatements that affected only the timing of item recognition and had no impact on annual net income (44 restatements). In addition, we deleted restatements if we were unable to obtain the necessary firm data from CRSP and COMPUSTAT (187 restatements). After identifying the sample of companies announcing restatements, we collected additional data on the restatements from the firms' amended SEC reports (Form 10-K/A(s) and Form 10-Q/A(s)), including: date of the restatement announcement, years and quarters restated, and original and restated net income in each period. Because the reporting of restatements is very heterogeneous, we had to consult multiple sources to find all necessary information. Some firms reported the impact of a restatement on earnings in the restatement announcement while some reported the impact in a footnote in their 10-Ks filed subsequent to their restatement announcement dates. Some firms filed amended 10-Qs for all restated periods while others restated net income and EPS in 10-Qs filed after the restated period. The originally reported numbers were collected from originally filed 10-Qs. Collecting this data required reviewing each restating firm's financial reports filed both before and after the restatement announcement. Table 2 , Panels A and B, report sample characteristics for the fiscal year end preceding the year or quarter of the first mistake (m-1) and for the first year after the restatement announcement (r+1). In the year preceding a mistake our average firm has a mean market value of $2.03 billion, a mean book value of assets of $1.92 billion, a mean book-to-market ratio of 0.52 and a mean ratio of long-term debt to total assets of 18 percent. Comparison of data in Panels A and B suggests that market value decreases subsequent to restatement, while leverage remains unchanged. Table 2 also reports statistics for the year prior to restatement (Panel C). The problem with this year is that it belongs to pre-error period for firms restating less than one year and to the error period for firms restating more than one year. However, many prior studies analyzing restating firms report descriptive statistics for this year. We include Panel C to make our sample comparable to prior studies. 19 All of the rest of our analysis carefully separates pre-error, error and post-restatement periods.
The majority of restating firms are listed on the NASDAQ (64.0%), with 29.7%
listed on the NYSE (Table 2 , Panel D). In 12 percent of our observations, the firm announced that the restatement was due to fraud ( Table 2 , Panel E). Our definition of fraudulent behavior is conservative because it is based solely on self-reported fraud and potentially omits instances of fraud that are only revealed by subsequent investigations.
Approximately half of restatements impact core accounts, such as revenue and expense (Table 2 , Panel E). Table 3 shows the distribution of restatements by industry (3 digit NAICs code).
The following five industries account for 40% of all restatements in our sample period: 1) computer and electronic product manufacturing, 2) publishing industries (except Internet), 3) credit intermediation and related activities, 4) professional, scientific, and technical services, and 5) machinery manufacturing.
<<<Insert Table 3 here>>>   19 Table 2 , Panel C shows that the mean book value of assets as reported at the fiscal year end prior to the restatement announcement (r-1), is $2.60 billion compared to $1.14 billion for the sample of 403 restatements made between 1995 and 1999, analyzed by Palmrose, Richardson and Scholz (2004) . The mean ratio of long-term debt to total assets is 19 percent (14 percent) for our sample, compared to a mean (median) ratio of 21 percent (6 percent) for Palmrose, Richardson and Scholz (2004) . Table 6 , Panel B (full sample) shows estimates of equation (2) for the combined samples of restating firms and control firms. The mistakes for control firms are assumed to be zero. Consistent with prior literature we find that the earnings response coefficient estimate is positive ( > 0). The estimate of the effect of earnings mistakes ( ) is also positive and significant, and is not statistically different from . This result suggests <<<Insert Table 6 here>>>
Short-term market reaction to the announcement of misstated earnings
We re-estimate equation (2) separately for the annual and quarterly sub-samples because annual restatements are deemed to be more serious. 21 For the annual sub-sample, we again find > 0 and > 0, and the two estimates are not different from one another. However, the quarterly sample produces statistically insignificant results. The insignificant quarterly results could be due to the much smaller sample size and different nature of accounting irregularities. Overall, the evidence suggests that investors are misled by misstated earnings when they are initially announced, for our sample of annual restatements. To ensure robustness of our results, we re-estimate equation (2) for restating firms only (Table 6 , Panel C). The results are similar for all three samples.
We extend equation (2) to test whether investors anticipate accounting mistakes.
We add an interaction between Mistake and a new variable, Distance_rest, which measures the distance of the quarter from restatement announcement. For example, for the last quarterly (10-Q) earnings announcement of the error period, Distance_rest =1, for the announcement of the quarterly report before that Distance_rest=2, and so on.
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Equation (2) and book-to-market matched control firm approach corrects reasonably well for crosssectional dependence due to the relation between size, book-to-market ratios, and returns.
Therefore, although we use graphs of long-term CARs to visually depict the trend in long-run returns, we perform all statistical tests using BHARs. Figure 2 shows CARs around the mistake and the restatement for annual downward restatements. 24 We can select the same fixed-length pre-error and postrestatement periods for all firms, but the error periods differ across firms. In plotting the abnormal returns over the error period, the longest period one can show for all firms in the sample is the minimum number of trading days during the error period, where the minimum is taken over all firms in the sample. As a result, the graph shows the minimum error period of length 267 for all firms, even though the error period is firm specific. An important feature of the graph is that pre-error, error and post-restatement periods are non-overlapping.
Cumulative abnormal returns
25
CARs are calculated as the difference between raw returns and market model predicted returns. Market model parameters are estimated for the period of 250 trading days ending on day -265 relative to the date of the mistake, in order to allow us to measure abnormal returns over the year prior to the mistake. Efendi, Srivastava and
Swanson (2007)) find an upward trend in CARs twelve months prior to the beginning of 24 Since all of our statistical inference is drawn from BHARs, we show only one graph using CARs for our main sample to allow for the comparison to prior studies. 
Buy-and-hold abnormal returns
Next we examine buy-and-hold abnormal returns for pre-error, error and post- Affleck-Graves (1999) and others, we calculate a buy-and-hold return ( ) over period τ for firm i as the geometric return:
where it R is the i th firm return on the t th day, and T is the number of trading days in period τ.
represents the actual experience of an investor who passively holds a sample firm for the period τ .
BHAR τ is calculated as:
, , bars show insignificant BHARs. We test whether BHARs differ statistically from zero using a t-test. Barber and Lyon (1997) , and Lyon, Barber and Tsai (1999) show that the control firm approach used in this study eliminates new listing, rebalancing and skewness biases, and yields well specified t-tests. Figure 2 ). It shows that these restating firms do not experience any abnormal performance prior to a mistake, other than during one month immediately preceding the start of the error period, during which they have a positive BHAR of 2.8% (p-value = 9%). BHARs during the first part of the error period vary in sign and are not significantly different from zero, but become negative in the second part of the error period and are negative and significant at 1% or better in the last three months before restatement announcement. The magnitude of the negative returns prior to restatement is large:
BHARs equal -6.2%, -5.3%, -5.1% during months -3, -2 and -1 before restatement, respectively. This result suggests that investors anticipate annual downward restatements.
BHAR for the period starting three months before the announcement of restatement and ending on day +5 after restatement announcement equals -28.0%
(-29.1% for survivors only), which is almost three times the average 3 day restatement announcement return. Examination of returns post restatement reveals that restating firms exhibit particularly negative performance in months 5 and 6 after restatement. BHARs for months +5 and +6 equal -4.61% and -4.53% (p-values of 2% and 4%, respectively).
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Figure 3.2 examines BHARs for annual downward restatements of 2 years or more. For these firms we are able to show a longer error period. Overall results are similar for this subset of firms and the full sample of annual downward restatements, especially in pre-error and post-restatement periods. We also observe negative returns before restatement. BHARs are negative and significant only during the month before restatement, and stay negative and significant one month after the restatement. The BHAR in month -1 equals -7.9% (p-value = 1%), while the BHAR in month +1 equals -6.9% (p-value = 6%). For this sample where the erroneous financial reports persist for more than two annual reports, investors appear to start anticipating downward restatements somewhat later and they take longer to fully impound the information contained in restatement announcements. This result suggests that mistakes that persist for more than 2 years are different and perhaps more difficult for investors to digest. For both samples, we find no abnormal returns prior to mistake and during the first part of the error period. BHARs are negative and significant one month before restatement in Figure 3 .3 and two months before restatement in Figure 3 .4, and are negative and significant two months after restatement in both figures. In Figure 3 .4, BHARs in month -2 and -1 relative to restatement equal -8.3% and -10.4% (p-values of 2% and 1%, respectively). For this sample, BHARs in month -3 and -5 relative to restatement are also significant and equal -9.8% in each of those months (p-values of 1% and 4%, respectively). 28 We also find negative returns in month +4 after restatements in 24 both figures. This result suggests early anticipation of quarterly downward restatements and slow reaction to their announcement. Overall firms that make quarterly downward restatements lose 33.5% over 4 months (months -2, -1, +1 and +2) surrounding the restatement, which is more than three times the average restatement announcement affect documented in earlier studies.
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Lastly, Figure 3 .5 shows monthly BHARs for annual upward restatements. We observe both positive and negative BHARs in the pre-error period: a negative BHAR equal to -11.5% in month -10 (p-value = 1%), a positive BHAR equal to 13.3% in month -9 (p-value = 1%), and a positive BHAR equal to 7.6% in month -1 (p-value = 4%).
These firms also experience negative BHARs of -10.6% (p-value = 4%) one month prior to restatement announcement. Month +10 relative to restatement has a -11.1% BHAR (pvalue = 10%). We do not place much weight on these results because there are only 35 upward restatements. Moreover, as shown in the analysis that follows (Table 7) , long-run BHARs are insignificant for full pre-error, error and post-restatement periods for annual upward restatements. Nevertheless, combined with the forthcoming results from Table 7, we can say that upward restatements are not good news, perhaps because they reveal management and internal control system failures. Table 7 presents further analysis of BHARs in the pre-error, error and post restatement periods. The difference between results shown in Figure 3 and Table 7 is that Table 7 splits the error period into quartiles, and estimates daily BHARs for each quartile.
The length of a quartile is firm-specific, and is calculated by dividing a firm's error period trading days by four. We also examine the patterns of BHARs three years before in figures are non-overlapping. However, month -3 relative to restatement will overlap with month +2, relative to mistake for firms with the minimum error period. mistake and three years after restatement, as well as around the announcement of the restatement for windows (-1, +1) and (-1, +5). BHARs in the last quartile of the error period are calculated for the period ending one day before the restatement announcement.
BHARs in the post restatement period are calculated starting five days after the restatement announcement. We assume that there are 250 trading days in one year.
Daily buy-and-hold abnormal returns are found as follows:
where is the daily buy-and-hold abnormal return for one of the three periods (pre-error, error, or post-restatement) of length l.
the buy-and-hold return for restating (control) firm i for period l. is the number of trading days in the period for firm i. N is the number of firms. To avoid survivorship bias,
we report results for a sample with firms that have any returns in the period studied, rather than a sample that had returns for the entire period (survivors). Confirming results of prior studies, we find negative and significant returns at the announcement of the restatement. The BHAR for the window (-1,+1) is -11.19%. We also find that restating firms underperform up to 3 years after a restatement. However, this result does not hold for any of the post restatement periods when we examine only survivors, suggesting that poorer performers stop trading. 30 All other results in this panel are robust when the sample is limited to survivors only.
The BHAR results for quarterly downward restatements are similar to those of annual downward restatements ( 
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32 To check the robustness of the results, we calculated BHARs for fixed length windows relative to mistake and restatement. Specifically, we calculated BHARs for 3, 6, 9, 12, 15, 18, and 24 months relative to mistake and restatement for annual restatements, and for 3, 6, 9 and 12 months for quarterly
Further analysis: core and fraud restatements
We also examine whether investors rely more on core accounts. Previous literature found that markets react more strongly to surprises in on-going operating income than to one-time special items (Elliott and Hanna (1996) ). If this is true and investors are misled, misstatement of core accounts (revenue and expense accounts)
should result in greater misvaluation and abnormal returns. Alternatively, investors may pay closer attention to core accounts and start seeing mistakes in such accounts sooner.
Arguably, intentional fraudulent misstatements of financial results are more difficult for investors to see through than random mistakes and make it more difficult for investors to estimate true earnings. Hence, restatements due to fraud could cause greater misvaluation. 33 We rely on the firm's restatement announcement to identify cases where fraud was involved.
Specifically, we test whether valuation in the error period is different for restatements of core versus non-core accounts and fraudulent restatements for annual and quarterly downward restatements. Due to small sample size, we do not perform this analysis for annual upward restatements.
34 Table 7 , Panel B.1 shows error period BHARs for sub-samples of restatements of core and non-core accounts for annual downward restatements. We find that the fourth restatements. The results are consistent with those found using firm specific quartiles of the error period (Table 7 ) and using monthly BHARs (Figure 3 ), so we do not report them here. 33 Prior studies find that the pressure to sustain positive earnings growth, inflation of CEO compensation, and issuance of equity and debt at favorable prices can motivate managers to intentionally misreport (Richardson, Tuna and Wu (2003) , Efendi, Srivastava and Swanson (2007) , Burns and Kedia (2006) and Lev, Ryan and Wu (2007) ). Offsetting these motivations is the fact that restatement of financial reports is a negative event for the management of the firm -management loses credibility with shareholders, customers and employees and is often forced to resign (Desai, Hogan, and Wilkins (2006) and Srinivasan (2005)).
28 34 We also re-estimated equation (2) quartile BHARs are much lower for the core sub-sample. 35 This result could be due to the fact that investors pay more attention to core accounts and penalize firms misstating core accounts more, or start to notice those mistakes sooner. 
Conclusion
This paper tests whether investors see through mistakes in reported earnings by examining market reaction to initially reported erroneous earnings and valuation of restating firms during the error period, before earnings are corrected. We also examine the long-run return performance of restating companies in three periods: (1) the period prior to the mistake (pre-error period); (2) the period after the mistake has been made but before the restatement (error period); (3) and the period after the restatement (postrestatement period). We focus on the error period, which we split into four quartiles. We identify all specific dates relative to key events, where is day n relative to event e. A negative value of n indicates days before the event, while a positive n indicates days after the event. For example, the superscript mistake indicates that the date is specified relative to the day of the mistake, with the day of the mistake being day zero. Superscript restatement indicates that days are numbered relative to the day of the restatement, with the day of the restatement being day zero. Thus, the symbol, D -b mistake refers to the trading day b days before the mistake occurs, and D a restatement indicates the trading day that falls a days after the restatement announcement. H is the mid point of the minimum error period. (-250, 133) and around restatements for the period (-133, 250) . Abnormal returns in the period ( , ) are averaged into a one day return and are plotted as a single day's abnormal return. For a firm with the minimum error period of 267 days, this is a one day window. For other firms this period varies in length. As a result, the graph shows the minimum error period of length 267 for all firms, even though the error period is firm specific. 
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Control firms are matched by size and book-to-market within the same three digit NAICS code. We compute size as the market value of equity: price per share times the number of shares outstanding. Bookto-market ratio is calculated as the ratio of book value in period m-1 divided by the market value of common equity in period m-1. Here, m is the year of the firm's mistake (if the firm is restating several years, we calculate the ratio for the year before the first restating year). For example, if the company restates 1996 financial statements, we find the matching firm according to the size and book-to-market ratios as of 1995. We eliminate all restating firms from the pool of potential control firms. We also require a control firm to have CRSP returns for as many days as its restating firm one year prior to the mistake and one year subsequent to the restatement. Figures 3.1-3.5 plot monthly BHARs for 220 annual downward restatements, 104 annual downward restatements of 2 years or more, 143 quarterly downward restatements, 79 quarterly downward restatements of 2 quarters or more, and 35 annual upward restatements announced between January 1, 1997 and June 30, 2002 and control firms, respectively. Annual restatements are restatements that include a revision of at least one annual (audited) report. Quarterly restatements are defined as restatements of quarterly financial statements only and no restatement of an annual (audited) report. Downward (upward) restatements are defined as restatements that result in downward (upward) revision of net income. Solid bars show BHARs that are significant at 10% or better, hollow bars show insignificant BHARs. We test whether BHARs differ statistically from zero using a t-test. The numbers in regular font on the horizontal axis show days relative to the mistake. The numbers in italic show days relative to the restatement announcement. Mistake marks the beginning of the year of the first mistake. Restatement marks the day of the restatement announcement. Only survivors are included in the calculation of each month's BHARs. Calculations before restatement start on day -2, and calculations after restatement start on day +6. Each month is assumed to have 21 trading days. Control firms are matched by size and book-to-market within the same three digit NAICS code. We compute size as the market value of equity: price per share times the number of shares outstanding. Book-to-market ratio is calculated as the ratio of book value in period m-1 divided by the market value of common equity in period m-1. Here, m is the year of the firm's mistake. We eliminate all restating firms from the pool of potential control firms. We also require a control firm to have CRSP returns for as many days as its restating firm one year prior to the mistake and one year subsequent to the restatement. Restatement dates and characteristics were hand collected from the Lexis-Nexis and Factiva databases. The LexisNexis and Factiva databases were researched using key words "restatement" "restat" "revis" "adjust" "error" and "responding to guidance from the SEC" during the period January 1, 1997 -June 30, 2002. We crossed checked our sample with the sample released by the GAO. Unlike the GAO sample, we excluded restatements that were caused by the adoption of new accounting rules, and retained only restatements due to a mistake or an improper interpretation of GAAP rules. (through June 30, 2002) 69 492 *16 of the restatement announcements in GAO sample were not announcements of new restatements, but rather releases of new information regarding already announced restatement. We deleted such announcements. This category also includes restatements that were not a result of a mistake or a misinterpretation of accounting rules (for example restatements due to changes in the number of shares).
Table 2: Characteristics of Restating Firms at Different Points in Time Relative to Mistakes and Restatements
Market value is the market value of equity calculated as stock price multiplied by number of shares outstanding. Book-tomarket ratio is calculated as the ratio of book value divided by the market value of common equity. Leverage is the value of long term debt divided by total assets. Core is a dummy variable that equals one if revenue or expense accounts were restated. Fraud is a dummy that equals one if the company announced fraud as a reason for restatement. In Panel B, we excluded two outliers with book-to-market equal to -436 and -292 when reporting statistics for book-to-market. Daily buy-and-hold abnormal returns (BHARs) are computed as the difference between buy-and-hold returns of restating firms and control firms in the same three digit NAICS code matched by size and book-to-market in the year before the first mistake. We split the error period into quartiles and estimate daily BHARs for each quartile. Each quartile represents one quarter of the entire error period for the specified restating firm. Thus, the length of a quartile is firm-specific and is calculated by dividing the number of trading days in the error period by four. We also examine the patterns of BHAR three years before mistake and three years after restatement, as well as around the restatement announcement windows (-1, +1) and (-1, +5). BHARs in the last quartile of the error period are calculated for the period ending one day before restatement announcement. BHARs in the post restatement period are calculated starting five days after the restatement announcement. We assume that there are 250 trading days in one year.
Daily buy-and-hold abnormal returns are found as follows: (6) where is the daily buy-and-hold abnormal return for one of three periods (pre-error, error, or post-restatement) of length l.
( ) is the buy-and-hold return for restating (control) firm I for period l. i is the number of trading days in the period for firm i. N is the number of firms. 
BHAR L
Annual restatements are defined as restatements that include a revision of at least one annual report. Quarterly restatements are defined as restatements of less than four quarters and no restatement of an annual report. Downward (upward) restatements are defined as restatements that result in downward (upward) revision of net income.
Core is a dummy variable that equals one if revenue or expense accounts were restated. Fraud is a dummy that equals one if the company announced fraud as a reason for restatement. The significance of BHARs is tested with t-tests. The significance of BHAR differences between sub-samples are tested with Wilcoxon non-parametric tests. *, **, and *** indicates significance at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. 46 47 
